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CASENOTE

Form Over Substance? Qualified Immunity
in Groh v. Ramirez

In Groh v. Ramirez,' the United States Supreme Court held in a 5-4
decision that a search warrant may be so facially defective that the
executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.2 The Court
reasoned that the warrant deficiency in this case, revolving around the
particularity requirement, flows directly from the text of the Fourth
Amendment,3 and thus, no reasonable officer could believe a warrant
that obviously did not comply with this standard was valid.4 The Court
proceeded to deny the executing officer qualified immunity by holding
that reliance upon this facially defective warrant was objectively
unreasonable.' This decision represents a restriction of the Court's
application of the objective reasonableness standard with respect to
qualified immunity by precluding examination of an officer's mistake of

1. 124 S. Ct. 1284 (2004).
2. Id. at 1294.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment states that "no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." Id.
4. Groh, 124 S. Ct. at 1293.
5. Id. at 1294.
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fact when executing a search based on probable cause and approved by
a neutral detached magistrate.

I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner Officer Groh, an eight year veteran of the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms ("ATF") at the time of the incident in
dispute, received information from a concerned citizen that respondents,
Joseph Ramirez and members of his family, had stockpiles of illegal
weapons on their ranch in Butte-Silver Bow County, Montana.
Petitioner proceeded to prepare a detailed warrant application and
affidavit particularly describing the search items sought including:
automatic firearms, grenades, grenade launchers, rocket launchers, and
any receipts representing evidence of purchase of the above items.
Petitioner also prepared a warrant form based on the detailed affidavit
and warrant application. However, under the section of the warrant
form requiring a description of the items included in the search,
petitioner inadvertently described the place (home) of respondents rather
than the search items listed in the warrant application and affidavit.
Petitioner presented all three documents to the magistrate, who in turn
signed the warrant form and the warrant application. Petitioner then
led a team of federal and local law enforcement officials in a search of
respondents' ranch. The search yielded no contraband, and no charges
were filed against respondents.6
Respondents brought an action against petitioner and other officers
based on Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of FederalBureau of Narcotics7
and 42 U.S.C. § 19838 for violation of their Fourth Amendment rights.9
The United States District Court of Montana entered summary judgment
on all claims for all defendants. 10 The district court found no Fourth
Amendment violation and further stated that, even if a constitutional
violation existed, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because
of the mere "typographical" nature of the error in the warrant.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the entire decision of the
district court except for the Fourth Amendment (Bivens) claim against
petitioner reasoning that the utter failure to particularly describe the
items in the warrant violated the Fourth Amendment. 2 Defendants

6. Id. at 1287-88.
7. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
10. Groh v. Ramirez, 124 S. Ct. 1284, 1289 (2004).
11. Id. at 1289.
12. Id.
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other than Groh were entitled to qualified immunity.13 With respect
to Groh, however, the court held that as leader of the search, he was not
entitled to qualified immunity because he failed to "'read the warrant
and satisfy [himself] that [he understood] its scope and limitations, and
that it [was] not defective in some obvious way.'" 14 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari. 5
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The civil action that exists in Groh v. Ramirez is based on petitioner's
alleged violation of respondents' Fourth Amendment rights. In Bivens
v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 6 the Supreme
Court held that persons suffering Fourth Amendment violations are
entitled to recover money damages in a civil action." v Subsequent to
the Bivens decision, the Court in Butz v.Economou"8 addressed the
issue of personal immunity for federal officials of the executive branch
in civil actions concerning the violation of constitutional rights."9 The
Court emphasized the gravity of this question because of the dual
importance of the immunity doctrine for the vindication of individual
constitutional rights as well as to facilitate the efficiency of the operation
of government.20 Denying the federal officials' claim for absolute
immunity, the Court in Butz held that federal executive officials
exercising discretion are entitled to qualified immunity, subject to
exceptions that may require the extension of absolute immunity based
on the centrality of the function to public business. 2' The Court in Butz
also concluded that the qualified immunity standard established in
Scheuer v. Rhodes22 would control in the federal context at issue before

13. Id.
14. Id. (quoting Ramirez v. Butte-Silver Bow County, 298 F.3d 1022, 1027 (9th Cir.
2002)).
15. Id.
16. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
17. Id. at 397.
18. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
19. Id. at 480.
20. Id. at 480-81. These competing interests require a delicate balancing of the
immunity doctrine by the Court to ensure the proper protection of individual rights as well
as maintaining efficient government functioning. Id.
21. Id. at 507. The Court mandated that if absolute immunity was essential for the
particular executive position to conduct the public's business then an exception to qualified
immunity would be necessary. Id.
22. 416 U.S. 232 (1974). In Scheuer estates of deceased students involved in the
infamous Kent State University incident brought suit, and the Court held, inter alia, that
the state officials involved were allowed qualified immunity depending upon the scope of
their responsibilities and discretion in the circumstances present. Id. at 247.
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the Court.2" The Court mandated that federal officials would not "be
liable for mere mistakes in judgment, whether the mistake is one of fact
or one of law."24
Four years after Butz, the Court continued to craft the doctrine of
25 The Court in Harlow
qualified immunity in Harlow v. Fitzgerald.
reasoned that within the analytical framework established in Butz-giving weight to both individual constitutional rights and the need for
government efficiency-the qualified immunity standard needed
modification to restrict accusations of malice against federal officials that
courts might view as questions of fact, thus eviscerating the officer's
immunity from trial with the ensuing factual inquiry.26 Therefore, the
Court held that government officials in discretionary roles are immune
from civil damages "insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known."27 Accordingly, this rule would limit the
liability exposure of government officials by disposing of insubstantial
cases through rigorous application of summary judgment. 2s
The evolution of the Court's qualified immunity doctrine converged
with the Court's Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule doctrine
subsequent to Harlow. The exclusionary rule in the criminal law
evidence suppression context requires application of an objective
reasonableness test of the acting officer's conduct to determine whether
the evidence will be excluded due to an unconstitutional search. In
Malley v. Briggs,2 9 the Court held that the standard of objective
reasonableness utilized in United States v. Leon3" in the criminal law
exclusionary rule context defines the qualified immunity accorded an
officer accused of a constitutional violation in a civil proceeding."1 In
Malley two citizens brought a civil action against an officer based on lack
of probable cause in applying for the warrant.3 2 The Court rejected the
officer's claim for absolute immunity in applying for a warrant and

23. Butz, 438 U.S. at 507.
24. Id.
25. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
26. Id. at 817-18.
27. Id. at 818.
28. Id. This "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights" standard would
allow the Court to dispose of weak cases at the summary judgment stage and protect
government officials from costly discovery and trials. Id.
29. 475 U.S. 335 (1986).
30. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
31. Malley, 475 U.S. at 344-45.
32. Id. at 338.
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established congruence between the exclusionary criminal context and
the civil context.3 3
In Leon the Court concluded that a "good faith" exception to the
general exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment was warranted.34
The Court held that evidence obtained by an officer who acted in an
objectively reasonable manner in obtaining a search warrant and acted
within the warrant's scope during execution will not be barred by the
exclusionary rule.35 The Court's decision was premised on the underlying purposes of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. 6 Deterrence
of police misconduct represents the preeminent purpose of the exclusionary rule. 37 Thus, in light of the substantial social costs imposed by
application of the exclusionary rule in suppressing probative evidence,
the Court restricted the rule to those situations when suppression of
Notably, the Court
evidence actually deters police misconduct.3 "
rejected delineation of bright line rules, deeming this as "speculative,"
and instead imposed an analytical framework relying on a case-by-case
examination and the imposition of the exclusionary rule only when it
will further the purposes of the exclusionary rule. 9
Subsequent to this merging of qualified immunity doctrine and
exclusionary rule determination, the Court demonstrated the application
4°
of the "objective reasonableness" test. In Massachusetts v. Sheppard,
a companion case to Leon, the Court refused to exclude evidence
uncovered during a search pursuant to a warrant that was thereafter
deemed invalid.4 ' In Sheppard law enforcement agents prepared a
detailed affidavit that established probable cause.42 However, the
officer had difficulty in finding a proper warrant form and substituted
The officer
a warrant form specifically used for narcotics cases.
presented the affidavit and defective warrant form to a neutral judge
and informed the judge of the form abnormalities. The judge assured

33. Id. at 345-46. Petitioner argued that as long as the warrant was applied for in good
faith, absolute immunity should exist and the judicial officer's determination to issue a
warrant should shield the Petitioner. The Court rejected this argument and mandated that
officers would be subjected to the objective reasonableness standard at this juncture. Id.
at 344.
34. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922.
35. Id. at 920-21.
36. Id. at 922.
37. Id. at 906.
38. Id. at 908.
39. Id. at 918.
40. 468 U.S. 981 (1984).
41. Id. at 990-91.
42. Id. at 989.
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the officer of the adequacy of the affidavit and told the officer he would
make the substantive corrections on the form. The judge signed the
form but failed to make the promised substantive changes. Consequently, the officer searched for murder weapons and evidence using a
warrant that described the items to be searched for as narcotics.4 3 The
Court held that while a Fourth Amendment violation may have existed,
the officer in this case acted in an objectively reasonable manner."
The Court concluded that any constitutional error committed was the
fault of the judge, not the officer.45 Accordingly, the purpose of the
application of the exclusionary rule would not be satisfied in the case,
and therefore, the evidence was not excluded. 6 Significantly, the Court
did not require the officer to read the signed warrant to determine the
objectives of the search. 7 The Court reasoned that the same officer
involved in the application stage also executed the warrant and the
officer was assured by the judge that the appropriate changes had been
made.4"
In Saucier v. Katz,49 the Court articulated a recent version of the
objective reasonableness test, holding that a determination of qualified
immunity requires an inquiry into whether a constitutional right was
violated, and if so, "whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that
his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted."" In Katz the
Court rejected a claim of excess force in arresting a citizen and held that
no clearly established rule prohibited the officer's action; thus, he was
entitled to qualified immunity.5' It was with this analytical framework
in mind that the Court in Groh confronted the issue at hand.
III.

A.

COURT'S RATIONALE

Majority Opinion
In Groh v. Ramirez,52 the Supreme Court applied United States v.
Leon5 3 and its progeny in a civil context to determine whether the law

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 984-87.
Id. at 990.
Id.
Id. at 990-91.
Id. at 990 n.6.
Id.
533 U.S. 194 (2001).
Id. at 202.
Id. at 209.
124 S. Ct. 1284 (2004).
468 U.S. 897 (1984).
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officer (petitioner) involved was entitled to qualified immunity. As is
required in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court was confronted
with the following questions: "(1) whether the search violated the
Fourth Amendment, and (2) if so, whether petitioner nevertheless is
entitled to qualified immunity."54
Addressing the threshold question regarding the existence of a Fourth
Amendment violation, the Court held that the warrant was "plainly
invalid" based on the textual wording of the Fourth Amendment.5" The
Court concluded that petitioner's case was flawed with respect to one of
four requirements mandated by the text of the Fourth Amendment. The
search warrant, despite being based on probable cause, supported by a
detailed affidavit, and amply describing the place to be searched, utterly
failed to describe the persons or things to be seized.56
Thereafter, the Court relied on Massachusetts v. Sheppard5 7 to
interject that case law established a uniformly applied rule that search
warrants deficient in the particularity requirement are unconstitutional."5 In fact the Court concluded that searches based on warrants that
utterly fail to describe the items to be seized should be deemed "warrantless" searches. 59 Based on that proposition, the Court invoked the
longstanding rule that absent exigent circumstances, a "warrantless"
search of a home is presumptively unreasonable.6 °
The Court reasoned that the incorporation doctrine" was inapplicable because the supporting documents were not present at the search
and no words of incorporation appeared on the warrant.6" Further, by
completely failing to describe the items to be searched, important
purposes served by the warrant requirement were effectively undermined, such as demonstration of lawful authority of the executing officer,
necessity of officer to search, and limitations of the search. 6' Therefore,
without fulfillment of the particularity requirement, the "inescapable
fact" was that the proper restraint exhibited by petitioner in execution
of the search was provided by petitioner himself and not by a neutral

54. Groh, 124 S. Ct. at 1287.
55. Id. at 1289.
56. Id. at 1288-89.
57. 468 U.S. 981 (1984).
58. Groh, 124 S. Ct. at 1291.
59. Id. at 1290.
60. Id.
61. The "incorporation" doctrine recognized by many Federal Courts of Appeals allows
a facially defective warrant to be righted by words of "incorporation" within the document
that incorporates attached supporting documents deemed sufficiently detailed. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1292.
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judicial officer as mandated by case precedent.'
The Court distinguished this case from Sheppard because there the judge gave the
executing officer verbal assurances that the warrant was satisfactory.65
Nevertheless, perplexingly, in light of Sheppard, the Court stated that
it would not have been reasonable to rely on such a patently deficient
warrant even if the magistrate had been aware of the defect.66 Here,
the Court held that a Fourth Amendment violation did exist because the
officer failed to ensure that the "search [was] lawfully authorized and
lawfully conducted." 67 Hence, petitioner's failure to possess a warrant
particularly describing the items to be seized was unreasonable, and
thus, unconstitutional. 8
The second question addressed by the Court was whether petitioner
was entitled to qualified immunity despite the constitutional violation.69 The standard enunciated by the Court was "whether the right
that was violated was 'clearly established"--that is, "whether it would
be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the
situation he confronted."0
The particularity requirement is explicitly written in the text of the
Fourth Amendment. Therefore, the Court reasoned no officer could
reasonably believe that a warrant containing such a defect with respect
to the particularity requirement was valid."
The Court relied on
Harlow to posit that if a right is clearly established, as it is here,
qualified immunity will usually fail."
Moreover, in distinguishing
Sheppard, the Court reasoned that petitioner could not rely on verbal
assurances by the magistrate because here the petitioner prepared the
warrant form.73
The Court emphasized that the petitioner should have been put on
notice that execution of a defective warrant imposed liability notwith-

64. Id.
65. Id. at 1292 n.4.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1293.
68. Id.
69. Id. (quoting Saucier,533 U.S. at 202).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. By way of contrast, in Massachusettsv. Sheppard,the officer gave the defective
form to the magistrate who assured the officer that the appropriate description of items
to be searched for would be completed by the magistrate. Interestingly, the Court in
Sheppard stated that while an officer not involved in the warrant preparation process
would normally read the issued warrant to determine the scope of the search, an officer
extensively involved in the preparation (as here) might not need to do so. 468 U.S. at 989
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standing the approval by a magistrate, based upon the existence of
internal agency regulations setting this standard forth. 74 Furthermore,
while reiterating the centrality of Sheppard and Leon in determining the
existence of qualified immunity, the Court rejected petitioner's argument
that, although he might have been negligent, forfeiture of qualified
immunity required a higher level of fault.75 Therefore, the Court held
that based upon Leon, "a warrant may be so facially deficient-i.e., in
failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be
the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be
seized-that
76
valid."
B.

Kennedy's Dissent (Joinedby Chief Justice Rehnquist)

1. Fourth Amendment Violation. Justice Kennedy accepted the
Court's rationale that the search conducted by petitioner represented a
Fourth Amendment violation. 77 The literal text of the Fourth Amendment requires items that are to be searched and seized to be described
with particularity in the warrant providing authorization for the search,
which did not occur in this case.78
2. Qualified Immunity. With respect to the qualified immunity
determination by the Court, Justice Kennedy wrote a strong dissent
arguing that petitioner was entitled to qualified immunity.7 9 Justice
Kennedy acknowledged that the controlling test to be applied mirrored
the objective reasonableness standard utilized in the "good faith"
exclusionary rule cases as mandated in Malley."0 Justice Kennedy
concluded that the proper framing of the question in this case was
"whether someone in the officer's position could reasonably but mistakenly conclude that his conduct complied with the Fourth Amendment.""1
In confronting this question, Justice Kennedy posited that precedent
allowed for mistakes of law, mistakes of fact, or mistakes of mixed

74. Groh, 124 S. Ct. at 1293-94.
75. Id. at 1294.
76. Id. (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 923).
77. Groh v. Ramirez, 124 S. Ct. 1284, 1295 (2004).
78. Id. at 1295 (Rehnquist, C.J. & Kennedy, J., dissenting).
79. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J. & Kennedy, J., dissenting).
80. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J. & Kennedy, J., dissenting).
81. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J. & Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483
U.S. 635, 641 (1987)).
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questions of law and fact in making a qualified immunity evaluation.82
He argued that petitioner in the instant case made a simple mistake of
fact.83 Petitioner filled out the detailed affidavit and warrant application, and thereafter, when typing a description of the place to be
searched he simply, and mistakenly, typed a description of the place to
be searched rather than the items to be searched.84 Petitioner, however, did not rely on the mistake in execution of the warrant.85 Thereafter, Justice Kennedy chronicled the difficult steps, and often timeconstrained circumstances, faced by an officer in fulfilling the warrant
process requirements, that demand a certain degree of leniency.86
Accordingly, Justice Kennedy concluded that clerical error within the
context of a properly executed search could be a reasonable mistake of
fact.87
Justice Kennedy stated that the Court failed to apply the proper
analytical framework. In other words, the Court misconstrued petitioner's error as a mistake of law rather than the appropriate mistake of
fact. 8 Justice Kennedy emphasized that the issue was "whether an
officer can reasonably fail to recognize a clerical error, not whether an
officer who recognizes a clerical error can reasonably conclude that a
defective warrant is legally valid," as the majority framed the question." He attacked the majority's reliance on the rule from Leon that
"a warrant may be so facially deficient.., that officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid," as a contorted interpretation of the
language in Leon.9" Justice Kennedy concluded that the most appropriate interpretation of this language is that an officer could not reasonably
rely on a facially deficient warrant, which did not occur here. 91
Therefore, Justice Kennedy declared that the Court's decision imposed
an ascendancy of "form" over protection of "substantive" rights.92

82. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J. & Kennedy, J., dissenting).
83. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J. & Kennedy, J., dissenting).
84. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J. & Kennedy, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 1296 (Rehnquist, C.J. & Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy stated
that, apparently, petitioner was not aware of the deficiency in the particularity requirement until the day after the search was conducted. Evidently, he led the search based on
knowledge already accrued in preparing the affidavit and application. Id. at 1295-96.
86. Id. at 1296 (Rehnquist, C.J. & Kennedy, J., dissenting).
87. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J. & Kennedy, J., dissenting).
88. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J. & Kennedy, J., dissenting).
89. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J. & Kennedy, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 1297 (Rehnquist, C.J. & Kennedy, J., dissenting).
91. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J. & Kennedy, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 1298 (Rehnquist, CJ. & Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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C. Thomas Dissent (Joined by Scalia;and Chief Justice Rehnquist
joins as to Part III)
1. Fourth Amendment. Justice Thomas rejected the majority's
analysis with respect to the constitutionality of petitioner's conduct.93
He construed that proper analysis required an examination into the
reasonableness of petitioner's actions before concluding a Fourth
Amendment violation existed.94 Here, Justice Thomas did not accept
the categorization of the warrant as "warrantless."" He posited that
case precedent involving warrantless searches centered on searches that
lacked the physical existence of a warrant rather than, as here, an
existent warrant that was later declared invalid.96 In making this
categorization, the Court avoided the pivotal inquiry of whether
warrants defective in the particularity requirement should be deemed
presumptively unreasonable.97
Justice Thomas was also critical of the Court's interpretation of the
"high function" served by a search warrant.9 " He stated that the "high
function" served by a search warrant was not the mere "physical
existence of the warrant and its typewritten contents."99 Rather, the
substantive process of establishing probable cause on the basis of the
judgment of a neutral detached judicial officer underpins the "high
function" served by a search warrant."' In the instant case, Justice
Thomas concluded that the critical requirements of the substantive
Accordingly, the search was reasonable and
process were met.''
constitutional.102
Justice Thomas also rejected the Court's articulation of the purposes,
beyond the prevention of general searches, that a warrant fully
describing the particularity of things to be searched would have
protected.0 3 He rejected this premise because neither the Federal
Rules for Criminal Procedure" ° nor the text of the Fourth Amendment

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Groh v. Ramirez, 124 S. Ct. 1284, 1299 (2004).
Id. at 1299 (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
Id. at 1300 (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
Id. at 1301 (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
FED. R. CRim. P.
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require an officer to present the warrant before the search. 10 5 Therefore, a search should not be deemed presumptively unreasonable for
failing to provide documentation of lawful authority before the search
ensued. 106
2. Qualified Immunity. Justice Thomas concluded that, even if a
constitutional violation existed, petitioner was entitled to qualified
immunity based on the objective reasonableness of his actions.' °7 He
based this conclusion on the Court's application of the level of generality
of the right in question and the relevant circumstances considered by the
Justice Thomas stated that, under the present circumstancCourt.'
es, the petitioner did not know the warrant was invalid when he carried
out the search in question and certainly not that it was legally void.0 9
He emphasized that the language relied upon by the majority in
articulating that "a warrant may be so facially deficient ... that the
executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid" demonstrates that this exception to the Leon good faith requirement is not
mandatorily applied, rather it is a precatory application." 0 Here, the
Court failed to explain why this exception applies and how petitioner's
mistake was unreasonable."'
Justice Thomas reasoned that the critical inquiry was "whether
petitioner's failure to notice the defect was objectively unreasonable."" 2
He indicated that the Court failed to provide any precedent that declared
a proofreading requirement necessary when the officer was fully
apprised of the situation and scope of the search and conducted the
search in that manner."' Furthermore, the Court did not establish a
requirement that an officer who "both prepares and executes the invalid
warrant ... can never rely on the magistrate's assurance that the
warrant is proper.""'* Indeed, the Court in Sheppard suggested that
an officer who both prepares the affidavit and executes the warrant may
not be required to proofread a warrant."' Therefore, in light of the

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
923).
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Groh, 124 S. Ct. at 1303 (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
Id. at 1301-02 (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
Id. at 1302 (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

(Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
(Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
(Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
(Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
at 1302-03 (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
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circumstances involved in the instant case in which petitioner correctly
executed all aspects of the warrant process except reading back over the
warrant, Justice Thomas concluded that the Court established a
proofreading requirement that deprived petitioner of qualified immunity
despite his objectively reasonable behavior. 116
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

The Court's application of the "objective reasonableness" test in Groh
represents a constriction of past applications of that test and results in
elevating "form" above "substance" in the warrant process. As the Court
enunciated in Butz, the qualified immunity doctrine protects mistakes
in judgment whether they revolve around mistakes of law, or fact, or
both." 7 Thus, an application of the "objective reasonableness" test
crafted in Leon would require due consideration of each of these distinct
possibilities. As indicated in the dissents of Justices Thomas and
Kennedy, the Court in Groh did not give ample consideration to the
possible mistake of fact by petitioner. Therefore, the Court framed the
question as a mistake of law and arguably imputed knowledge of the
omission to petitioner, which significantly altered the analysis. This
precedent established in Groh will inevitably lead to a proliferation of
creative lawyering in attempts to frame qualified immunity questions as
mistakes of law while ignoring any mistakes of fact by officers in the line
of duty. This could lead to the awkward consequence of a technical
"proofreading" requirement for all warrants regardless of their adherence
to the substantive protections afforded by the warrant process.
Of course, any argument that elevation of form over substance is
occurring demands definition of the boundaries of those concepts. A
critical need within this inquiry would be clear delineation of the
substantive purposes served by the warrant process. In Groh the Court
gave credence to substantive purposes beyond prevention of general
searches that included: (1) lawful authority of the officer, (2) necessity
to search, and (3) the limits of the power to search." 8 As the Court
indicated, pointed questions with respect to the right of a searchee to
examine a search warrant prior to a search remain open. Substantial
support (e.g., Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure) indicates this right
may not exist for the searchee, which then demands Court definition of
the hierarchy of the substantive purposes of the warrant process and

116.
117.
118.

Id. at 1303 (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978).
Groh v. Ramirez, 124 S. Ct. 1284, 1292 (2004).
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how these purposes should be evaluated in the context of qualified
immunity and the exclusionary rule.
A further inquiry requiring Court elucidation centers on the exact
relationship between the purposes of qualified immunity in comparison
with the purposes of the exclusionary rule. The Court has mandated
that the Leon test for objective reasonableness controls determination of
the qualified immunity inquiry. 1 9 The Court has stressed the importance of the nexus between the purpose of the exclusionary rule
(prevention of police misconduct) and its application. Therefore, if the
Leon exclusionary test completely controls the contours of the qualified
immunity doctrine, this question of the nexus between denial of qualified
immunity and the prevention of police misconduct becomes an integral
part of any qualified immunity analysis. In Groh the apparent honest
mistake made by the officer would be difficult to frame as police
misconduct by any standard. The Court could bring clarity to this
analysis by commenting on the applicability of the police misconduct
purpose of the exclusionary rule in the qualified immunity context.
In addition, the impact of Groh on the dual concerns driving the
immunity doctrine-individual constitutional rights and the need for
government law enforcement efficiency-should be reexamined.
Arguably, the pivotal substantive purpose of the warrant process is the
determination of probable cause by a neutral judicial officer, and a
search that adhered in scope to that determination was satisfied in
Groh. Nevertheless, the officer in Groh was exposed to civil liability
despite demonstrating good faith throughout the warrant process. This
result illustrates the possible negative impact on law enforcement
efficiency that could surface in the wake of Groh. In the alternative, the
Court could avoid many of the complexities raised here by reverting to
the traditional analysis that allows "objectively reasonable" mistakes of
fact, law, or both and gives the Court ample flexibility to address the
infinite nuances of the Fourth Amendment.
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